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This study investigates experimentally the effects of locality on learning and strategic be-
haviour in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We compare a simple situation that models space
(players interact only with their neighbours) with one that does not (players interact with all
members of the population). Within this context different information conditions are stud-
ied. We find that imitation, while assumed to be a driving force in many models of spatial
evolution, is a negligible factor in the experiment. Behaviour is driven by reinforcement
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1 Introduction
Space has been regarded as being crucial for many economic situations not only since Hotelling
(1929). Restaurants or shops along streets do not compete equally with all other restaurants
or shops on that street. Strategic interaction and imitation is more important among producers
of similar products. Nevertheless, economists often have to simplify problems by neglecting
geographic space or product space and only studying a situation where all agents influence each
other in the same way. The latter is what we call a ‘non-spatial’ situation. However, over the last
few decades there has been a growing awareness for the need to introduce space into economic
reasoning in particular by evolutionary game theorists (see Axelrod (1984), Nowak and May
(1992), Nowak and May (1993), Bonhoeffer, May, and Nowak (1993), Lindgreen and Nordahl
(1994), Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), Kirchkamp (1999), Kirchkamp (2000)). A large
part of this literature concentrates on prisoners’ dilemmas and shows how imitating players may
end up cooperating in spatial structures whereas they will not cooperate in a spaceless structure.
In these imitation models space serves two purposes: Space reduces the possibility to exploit
cooperating players (they can only be exploited by their neighbours) but space also reduces the
visibility of successful non-cooperators (again, they can only be imitated by their neighbours).
We will give an example for such a process in section 3.
As an application we should expect that e.g. cartels were found mainly in industries where
product space or geographic space is relevant for the interaction among firms.
In this paper we will investigate this theory with the help of experiments. In contrast to the
theoretical prediction we will find in our experiments less cooperation in the spatial structure
and not more. A detailed analysis of our data shows that there are two reasons for this finding:
Firstly, players in our experiments do not imitate but learn mainly through reinforcement. As
a result the level of cooperation in the spatial structure drops. Secondly, there is, under some
conditions, a strategic reason to cooperate, but only in the spaceless structure. As a consequence
the level of cooperation in the spaceless structure raises.
First experiments to investigate the role of space have been done with coordination games by
Keser, Erhart, and Berninghaus (1997, 1998). They find that players choose payoff dominant
equilibria in a non-spatial structure but risk dominant equilibria in a spatial structure. The
context of coordination games, however, does not allow to easily differentiate between myopic
optimisation1, imitation, or reinforcement learning2. A player in a coordination game who
chooses the same strategy as his or her neighbours might do this as a result of learning through
imitation or as a result of myopic optimisation. In coordination games both motives often
imply the same action. In the current paper, we choose the context of a prisoners’ dilemma
where myopic optimisation, learning from own experience and learning through imitation often
recommend different actions and, thus, can be disentangled more easily.
Learning through reinforcement and imitation are concepts often referred to in evolutionary
game theory. Reinforcement learning (Bo¨rgers and Sarin 1997, Erev and Roth 1998) assumes
that players are more likely to repeat successful rather than unsuccessful own choices. Since in
1Myopic optimisation has been analysed in a spatial context by Ellison (1993) and Berninghaus and Schwalbe
(1996).
2Learning through imitation or reinforcement learning has been analysed in a spatial context by Kirchkamp
(1999).
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a prisoners’ dilemma non-cooperation is always more successful than cooperation, pure rein-
forcement learning over actions in the stage game always leads to non-cooperation, regardless
of the spatial structure.
Imitation extends learning to observed players. Players are more likely to copy successful
rather than unsuccessful neighbours. A typical learning rule, copy best average,3 assumes that
players calculate average payoffs of all strategies they observe in their neighbourhood (includ-
ing their own payoff) and choose the strategy with the highest average payoff. The player’s own
experience gets the same weight as the experience of any neighbour. In other words, copy best
average presupposes only a moderate amount of reinforcement but a lot of imitation.
In the following we will always assume that learning applies to the choice of actions in
the stage game and not to the choice of repeated game strategies. Thus, we avoid the prob-
lem of identification of repeated game strategies from the data. Given that participants in our
experiments have to choose actions in every round this approach seems to be appropriate.
We will describe the experimental setup in section 2. In section 3, we briefly summarise a the-
oretical argument that is based on a simple imitation model and that suggests more cooperation
in a spatial world than in a non-spatial world. In section 4 we come to our experimental results,
which indicate the opposite: less cooperation in space than in a non-spatial setting. We will
study stage game behaviour in section 4.1. Section 4.2 studies reinforcement and imitation and
section 4.3 strategic behaviour and the motive to reciprocate. A second experimental setup,
where players are more focused on learning, will be introduced in section 4.4. We will find that
in this setup differences between the spatial and non-spatial structure become much smaller. A
third setup, where we seed the population with computerised cooperators, will be discussed in
section 4.5. Section 5 concludes.
2 The experimental setup
In the following, we describe results from 35 experiments in Barcelona and Mannheim, involv-
ing 339 participants and 5 different treatments. A list of these experiments is given in appendix
A.
In the current section we will give a description of the first two treatments. One of them will
be called a ‘circle’ treatment, the other ‘group’ treatment. The remaining three treatments are
described in section 4.4 below.
In the circle treatment we study a spatial structure of 18 players. Participants are randomly
seated in front of computer terminals that are networked to create a neighbourhood structure
(see left part of figure 1). Each player interacts in each round with two neighbours to the left
and two neighbours to the right. Player x0, e.g., is in interaction with x1,x2, and y1,y2. Player
x2, however, is in interaction with x3,x4, and x1,x0. Players are able to observe payoffs and
strategies of each of their neighbours.
In the group treatment we study groups consisting of five players each. Each member of a
group interacts in every round of the experiment with all members of the group (see right part
of figure 1).
3See Axelrod (1984), Bonhoeffer, May, and Nowak (1993), Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), Kirchkamp
(2000), Lindgreen and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992), Nowak and May (1993).
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FIGURE 1: Neighbourhoods
Thus, both in the group and in the circle treatment the number of interaction partners is
four. Theory4 predicts no cooperation in groups, independent of the size of the groups, and
sometimes5 cooperation in circles, independent of the size of the neighbourhoods in circles. We
are, hence, free to choose any group size for our comparison. For simplicity, we use the same
size of neighbourhoods in both structures. Later, when we find that our experiment does not
confirm the theoretical prediction, we can relate this deviation to strategic behaviour, imitation
and reinforcement learning. Most importantly, imitation is much weaker than assumed in the
theory and not strong enough to support cooperation. We have no reason to assume that this
finding depends on the precise size of the neighbourhood.
During any session of the experiment, players always interact with the same neighbours.
Sessions last for 80 periods. In each period participants play a prisoners’ dilemma against
all members of their neighbourhood/group. They can only use the same strategy against all
neighbours/group members. The payoff table (table 1)6 is displayed on the participants’ screen
throughout the experiment. Playing D gives always a payoff that is 4 points higher than the
payoff from playing C, but each C contributes 5 points to the payoff of each of his or her
neighbours.
During the course of play players observe their own payoff and the payoff and actions of
their neighbours. This takes place in circles and groups in the same way. In the following
we give an example of the situation in a circle. Let us assume that a cluster of five players
who choose action C is located within a larger cluster of players who all choose D as shown in
table 2. Consider player 1 from table 2 who has two neighbours with action C and two other
neighbours with D. The representation of payoffs in this period for this player is shown in
4E.g. imitating agents that use copy best average or copy best as a learning rule (Nowak and May 1992, Eshel,
Samuelson, and Shaked 1998).
5Depending on payoffs and initial configuration.
6In the experiment C and D are represented in different colours (blue and red) and are actually called (neutrally)
‘A’ and ‘B’. In some sessions C is red (‘A’)and D is blue (‘B’), in others D is red (‘A’) and C is blue (‘B’).
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Payoff:
own number of
[
neighbours
group members
]
choosing C
action 0 1 2 3 4
C 0 5 10 15 20
D 4 9 14 19 24
TABLE 1: Payoff Matrix
Player · · · · · · 1 2 · · ·
Neighbourhood of Player 1 - - ⇓ - -
Action: · · · D C C C C C D D D D D · · ·
# of other Cs in
the neighbourhood · · · 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 1 0 0 0
Own payoff · · · 14 10 15 20 15 10 14 9 4 4 4
Average
payoff of C 12.5 15 15 14 15 15 12.5 10 — — —
payoff of D 9 11.5 14 — 14 11.5 9 7.75 7 5.25 4
in the neighbourhood
TABLE 2: Example of a neighbourhood of Cs and Ds
table 3. The player’s own payoff is 10 , which is displayed next to the player’s own action
C. The player has two neighbours with action C and payoffs 20 and 15 respectively. The
two other neighbours chose action D and receive payoffs 14 and 9 . Payoffs obtained with
either C or D are displayed in different colours in the experiment. The payoffs are shown in
the rightmost column and ordered from highest to lowest. Thus, it is not obvious to the player
which of the player’s neighbours has chosen a certain action and received a certain payoff.
3 A simple imitation model
We will now sketch a simple and common evolutionary learning dynamics that is based on
imitation7 and that suggests more cooperation in a spatial environment and less in a non-spatial
one. From the example in this section, it should become clear that with imitation we should
expect more cooperation in the spatial structure than in the non-spatial one. In section 4.1,
however, we will experimentally find less cooperation in the spatial structure. We conclude
that there must be another effect and introduce strategic behaviour as such an effect in section
4.3. We will further show in sections 4.2, 4.4, and 4.5 that players’ actions are not driven by
imitation. With this argument we do not want to contradict evolutionary game theory. What
we want to point out is that imitation, while theoretically being an interesting concept, does not
seem to play an important role in our experiments.
7Similar dynamics are used e.g. in Bonnhoeffer, Nowak, and May (1993), Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked
(1998), Kirchkamp (2000), Lindgren and Nordahl (1994), Nowak and May (1992, 1993).
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History
R Your
O strategy your neighbours
U and received
N gains
D are
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... C 10 20 15 14 9
Payoffs of Cs are shown in a box , payoffs of Ds are shown in gray . In the experiment we use the
colours red and blue (randomly assigned to C and D).
TABLE 3: Example of payoff representation for player 1 from table 2.
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... D 14 15 10 9 4
Payoffs of Cs are shown in a box , payoffs of Ds are shown in gray . In the experiment we use the
colours red and blue (randomly assigned to C and D).
TABLE 4: Example of payoff representation for player 2 from table 2.
Obviously, in a non-spatial setting with myopic imitation, or replicator dynamics, non-
cooperation is always more successful than cooperation. Hence, in a non-spatial setting, co-
operation always dies out. In the upper part of figure 2 we give an example. We simulate a
group of five players who always imitate the strategy with the highest average payoff in their
neighbourhood (copy best average). With a small probability (1% in this example) players ‘mu-
tate’ and chose the other strategy. We start with 5 cooperating players who imitate cooperation
until in period 13 one player mutates and plays D. Being very successful, this player is imitated
by all neighbours and from period 14 on everybody plays D. Further mutants that appear in
later periods do not lead the group back to cooperation.
With spatial learning (Axelrod 1984, Bonhoeffer, May, and Nowak 1993, Eshel, Samuel-
son, and Shaked 1998, Kirchkamp 2000, Lindgreen and Nordahl 1994, Nowak and May 1992,
Nowak and May 1993) however, cooperation is protected through space and may, hence, sur-
vive.8 Consider player 2 from table 2. The representation of payoffs for this player in the
experiment is shown in table 4. An imitating D with this information finds C to obtain higher
payoffs (15 and 10) than D (9 and 4) and may decide to become a C — thus, cooperation may
survive or grow9. Also in our example (see the bottom part of figure 2) cooperation grows from
the initial configuration of only five Cs and is not much affected by mutants.
8With myopic optimisation (Ellison 1993) players would obviously never cooperate.
9Once the cluster of Ds becomes small the payoff of the remaining Ds grows and the process stops or enters
a cycle. With standard imitation processes stable equilibria are often reached when clusters of successful Cs are
separated by small clusters of equally successful Ds.
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‘Copy best average’ imitation in a circle:
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t = 1 20 60 80
l =C, m =D. The first mutant D makes cooperation disappear completely in groups. Cooperation in circles,
however, persists despite mutant Ds.
(The imitation rule is ‘copy best average payoff’, the mutation rate is 1%, the imitation and interaction radius is 2,
as in the experiment. Simulations starts with 5 cooperators in the first period.)
FIGURE 2: Simulated learning.
4 Results
In a first treatment we ran 5 sessions, each lasting for 80 rounds. In this treatment players are
located in a circle, know the payoff matrix (table 1) and receive per individual payoff feedback
as in table 3. The players’ actions are shown in appendix B.1. In a second treatment we ran 10
sessions, with players now located in groups of 5 players each. The information given was as
in the first treatment. Actions are displayed in appendix B.2.
In section 4.1 we study stage game behaviour and find that in contrast to the simple imitation
dynamics discussed in section 3 there is more cooperation without space (in groups) than with
space (in circles). In section 4.2 we study learning, which in both structures seems mainly be
driven by reinforcement and not by imitation. Section 4.3 introduces strategic behaviour and
gives an explanation for the larger amount of cooperation in groups. In sections 4.4 and 4.5
study a modified treatment where we eliminated strategic behaviour. Again we find that players
learn mostly through reinforcement and not through imitation. As a result cooperation is not
supported through the spatial structure.
4.1 Cooperative behaviour
In figure 3 we show the relative frequency of cooperation in circles and groups. At the beginning
of the treatments levels of cooperation are about the same in groups and in circles and similar
to what is found in other non-spatial experiments10.
10Bonacich et. al. (1976) studied cooperation within groups of 3, 6, and 9 players in a game where cooperation
is less attractive than in our game. They found levels of about 30% of cooperation in groups, which is close to the
results in our experiment.
Fox and Guyer (1977) used a non-linear payoff scheme where sometimes cooperation was more attractive than
in our game. They found more cooperation (around 50%) in a game with groups of 3 and 12 players.
7
fre
q.
 o
f c
oo
p.
 p
la
ye
rs
time
 Circle (detailed info)  Groups (detailed info)
1-20 21-60 61-80
.1
.4
The figure shows the average frequency of cooperation for the first 20 periods, period 20–60, and
for period 61-80.
FIGURE 3: Frequency of cooperative players in circles and groups over time
During the treatment the frequency of cooperating players decreases substantially in circles
and remains more or less constant in groups. We find that the frequency of cooperation in
the last 60 periods of the experiment is significantly lower in circles than in groups11. This
finding contradicts the prediction of the imitation model that we sketched in section 3. There
we motivated more cooperation in circles due to learning from neighbours. Since here we find
less cooperation we will first check in section 4.2 whether players’ learning behaviour fits the
properties assumed in section 3. We will find an explanation for the low levels of cooperation
in circles, but we will still miss an explanation for the relatively high levels of cooperation in
the spaceless structure. To fill this gap we will then in section 4.3 study reciprocity.
4.2 A simple model of reinforcement and imitation
We estimate the following logit model:
P(ct+1) = L(β0 +βownuc,ownt +βotheruc,othert ) (1)
where L(x) = ex/(1+ ex), ct+1 is 1 if a player cooperates tomorrow, and 0 otherwise, uc,ownt is
the player’s own payoff from cooperation as seen in period t and uc,othert is the player’s neigh-
bour’s payoff from cooperation as seen in period t12. The factor βown captures, hence, rein-
forcement, βother measures the amount of imitation, and β0 a general inclination to cooperate.
11A t-test yields t = 3.20, P>|t| = 0.006. When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance
we have to take into account that observations within any of our experiments may be correlated. We can, however,
assume that covariances of observations from different experiments are zero. Covariances of observations from the
same experiment are replaced by the appropriate product of the residuals (Rogers 1993). We will use this approach
throughout the paper to calculate standard errors.
Still, we can also calculate a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test and find a z = 2.327, P>|z| =
0.0200.
12If a player does not cooperate in a given period t the value of uc,ownt can not directly be determined. In this
case we recursively use uc,ownt := u
c,own
t−1 until we reach a period where the player actually cooperated. In the same
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coeff. from Circles
eq. (1) β σ t P>|t| 95% conf. interval
uc,own .0962337 .0066259 14.52 0.000 .0832471 .1092203
uc,other .0682104 .005713 11.94 0.000 .057013 .0794077
c −1.951959 .0357078 −54.66 0.000 −2.021945 −1.881973
Groups
uc,own .0509183 .0082287 6.19 0.000 .0347903 .0670463
uc,other .0794446 .0078832 10.08 0.000 .0639938 .0948954
c −1.58941 .0558171 −28.48 0.000 −1.69881 −1.480011
TABLE 5: GEE population-averaged estimation of equation (1)
coeff. from Circles
eq. (1) β σ t P>|t| 95% conf. interval
uc,own .088943 .0056999 15.60 0.000 .0777713 .1001147
uc,other .1040525 .0052749 19.73 0.000 .0937138 .1143912
c −2.062085 .0304381 −67.75 0.000 −2.121743 −2.002428
Groups
uc,own .0140842 .0067888 2.07 0.038 .0007785 .0273899
uc,other .1626808 .007345 22.15 0.000 .1482849 .1770767
c −1.743681 .0427707 −40.77 0.000 −1.82751 −1.659852
TABLE 6: Logit estimation of equation (1)
We do three estimations of the above model. One is a GEE population-averaged model
(Liang and Zeger 1986) that takes into account the AR(1) nature of the process13. We use as
a link function the logistic function and specify ct+1 to be binomially distributed. Results are
shown in table 5. As a reference we also show a standard logit estimation that does not take
into account the AR(1) process in table 6. We see that qualitatively the relations between the
coefficients remain the same within the two estimations. This justifies that we can take the
standard logistic model for the individual estimates where the GEE population-averaged model
can not be applied. The cumulative distribution for the coefficients that were, in a third
approach, estimated separately for each individual, is shown in figure 4. As a reference for
what evolutionary game theory would assume (see section 3) the figure includes estimates for
100 simulated populations where players follow the copy-best-average rule.
As we see in figure 4 players are more sensitive to their own payoff in experiments than the
simulated players who use a copy-best-average rule. Likewise they are less sensitive to their
neighbours’ payoff. Table 7 summarises tests for equality of βown, respectively βother, in the
way we define recursively uc,othert := u
c,other
t−1 until we reach a period where the player actually cooperated to define
u
c,other
t . For the estimation we have dropped the first 20 periods to give participants some time to learn.
13We use the AR(1) approach since we should expect correlations within the variables of our approach. The
dependent variable ct+1 influences the explanatory variable uc,othert in the next period. Since the size of the impact
depends on the number of other cooperators and varies from period obtaining a perfect estimation is hardly possible
but also not necessary since we are only interested in relative magnitudes of the coefficients.
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Solid lines show the cumulative distribution of individual estimates for each participant in our exper-
iment. Dotted and dashed lines show results for 100 simulated populations following the learning
rule copy-best-average with a mutation rate of 0.1.
FIGURE 4: Cumulative distribution of estimated coefficients from equation (1).
βownCopy best = βownExperiment βotherCopy best = βotherExperiment
Circles t = −4.48 P<t = 0.000 t = 4.55 P>t = 0.000
Groups t = −1.84 P<t = 0.034 t = 1.72 P>t = 0.043
Tests are based on the coefficients that were estimated for each individual separately. Outliers were
eliminated using Hadi’s method (Hadi 1992, Hadi 1994). When calculating levels of standard devia-
tions and levels of significance we take into account that observations within any of our experiments
may be correlated (see footnote 11).
TABLE 7: Learning in the experiment versus copy best average
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coeff. from robust regression rank sum test
eq. (1) βc σb t P>|t| 95% conf. interval z P>|z|
ˆβown .1063097 .0486674 2.18 0.046 .0019286 .2106908 2.082 0.0373
ˆβother −.0947037 .0402311 −2.35 0.034 −.1809909 −.0084165 −1.837 0.0662
ˆβ0 −.5807385 .2316169 −2.51 0.025 −1.077507 −.0839696 −2.082 0.0373
ˆβown − ˆβother .2010135 .0618886 3.25 0.006 .0682756 .3337513 2.327 0.0200
Outliers were eliminated using Hadi’s method (Hadi 1992, Hadi 1994). When calculating levels of
standard deviations and levels of significance we take into account that observations within any of
our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11).
Estimated coefficients show differences between circles and groups.
TABLE 8: Estimation of equation (2) for coefficients from equation (1)
experiment and in the simulations. In particular for circles the results are highly significant.
Remember that in section 3 we explained that survival of cooperation crucially depends on
learning from neighbours. Finding only a small amount of cooperation in circles should, hence,
not come at a surprise, given that player do not imitate their neighbours.
To study differences between groups and circles we estimate for each coefficient βown,βother,β0
the following robust regression
b = c+βcdc (2)
where b is the estimation of one the coefficients from equation (1), c is a constant, dc is a dummy
that is one for circles and zero otherwise. Results are shown in table 8.
We see that learning behaviour in circles is significantly different from learning in groups.
In particular the coefficient ˆβother is significantly smaller in circles than in groups, i.e. partic-
ipants in circles are significantly less sensitive to their neighbours’ payoff than participants in
groups. This finding is in line with what we should expect theoretically for learning rules in
a spatial environment. A neighbour’s success with a strategy may be due to this neighbour’s
neighbourhood and might not apply to the learning players (Kirchkamp 2000). Hence, a player
living in a spatial structure should be less sensitive to his or her neighbour’s payoffs than one in
a non-spatial one. Consistent with this finding also the difference ˆβown − ˆβother is significantly
larger in circles.
In the current section we have found an explanation for the small amount of cooperation in
circles. What we are still missing is an explanation for the relatively large amount of cooperation
in groups. We will give this explanation in section 4.3.
4.3 Reasons to speculate for reciprocity
What reasons does a player have to choose C? In this section we show that choosing C increases
payoff in groups but not in circles. To do that we estimate
u
c,all
t+1 = β0 +β1ct +β2ct+1 (3)
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The figure shows the cumulative frequency of the individual estimates of the coefficient β1 from
equation (3), separately for groups and circles.
FIGURE 5: Impact of choosing C, depending on the structure
robust regression rank sum test
β σb t P>|t| 95% conf. interval z P>|z|
βg 1.311531 .2780627 4.72 0.000 .7151455 1.907916 2.449 0.0143
c .7638131 .0951821 8.02 0.000 .5596678 .9679585
Outliers were eliminated using Hadi’s method (Hadi 1992, Hadi 1994). When calculating levels of
standard deviations and levels of significance we take into account that observations within any of
our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11).
TABLE 9: Result of estimating equation (4)
where uc,allt+1 is the average payoff of all Cs in the neighbourhood in period t + 1, ct is one if a
player cooperates in period t and zero otherwise and ct+1 is one of a player cooperates in period
t +1 and zero otherwise14.
The cumulative frequency of the individual estimates of the coefficient β1 is shown in figure
5. We see that the distribution of the β1s is located more to the right in groups. To test this more
formally we estimate the following model
ˆβ1 = c+βgdg (4)
where ˆβ1 is the value of β1 from equation (3) that we estimated for each participant separately,
c is a constant, and dg is a dummy that is one for groups and zero otherwise. The results are
shown in table 9. The coefficient βg measures the additional gain from C in groups. We find that
players in groups have significantly more reasons to choose C than players in circles. (P>|t| =
0.0003)15. Also a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test finds the difference
14Using the average payoff from C as a dependent variable and not the individual payoff has the advantage that
our result is less influenced by what the player does at t +1.
15When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we take into account that observations
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TABLE 10: Representation of payoffs in the ‘less-information’ treatment
highly significant when comparing the 10 average values for β1 in groups with the 5 average
values for β1 in circles (z = 2.449, P>|z| = 0.0143).
Here we only measure how players can influence the reciprocal behaviour of their neigh-
bours and what this means for their own behaviour. A more detailed discussion of why this
could be the case can be found in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
who relate reciprocity to utility from own and others’ payoff.
4.4 An experiment with less information
In section 4.3 above we have found that participants in the groups-treatment of our experi-
ment reciprocate significantly stronger than those in the circle-treatment. Why is this the case?
Reciprocity requires an understanding of the strategic situation, in particular of the prisoners’
dilemma nature of the game. To establish a setting where reciprocity does not play a role, we
decided to run a series of experiments with less information about the strategic situation but
similar possibilities to learn. Instead of presenting the information as described in section 2 we
never told subjects the payoff matrix (table 1) in this treatment. Further we did not give the
per individual payoff feedback as in table 3 that would allow to quickly reconstruct the payoff
matrix. Subjects only knew that they were playing a symmetric game and received information
about average payoffs of the two strategies in their neighbourhood in each round as shown in ta-
ble 10. We will call this condition in the following ‘less information’ in contrast to the ‘detailed
information’ discussed in the previous sections.
Appendices B.3 and B.4 show the raw data for this condition in the circle and groups treat-
ment respectively. In figure 6 we show how the relative frequency of cooperation develops in
circles and groups over time. We see that once players are more focused on learning and less
on strategic considerations, levels of cooperation are no longer significantly different16.
We estimate again equation (3), now for the less information treatment. The distribution
of ˆβ1 is shown in figure 7. We see that the modification of our setup successfully eliminated
most of the potential for strategic behaviour. Playing C no longer affects significantly payoffs
within any of our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11).
16When testing whether the relative frequency of cooperation in the less-information treatment differs in circles
from the one in groups we do not find a significant difference: t = −0.79, P>|t| = 0.445. A two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) comes to a similar conclusion: z = 0.467, P>|z| = 0.6404.
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The figure shows the average frequency of cooperation in circles and groups for the first 20 periods,
period 20–60, and for period 61-80.
FIGURE 6: Frequency of cooperative players over time in the full information and in the less
information treatment
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The figure shows the cumulative frequency of the individual estimates of the coefficient ˆβ1 from
equation (3), separately for groups and circles and separately for the two information conditions.
FIGURE 7: Impact of choosing C, depending on information and structure
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robust regression rank sum test
β σb t P>|t| 95% conf. interval z P>|z|
βg .3640991 .3496799 1.04 0.317 −.3913383 1.119537 0.467 0.6404
c −.3679798 .2642448 −1.39 0.187 −.9388459 .2028864
TABLE 11: Result of estimating equation (4) in the less information treatment
coeff. from robust regression rank sum test
eq. (1) βc σb t P>|t| 95% conf. interval z P>|z|
ˆβown .0840038 .0686664 1.22 0.247 −.06713 .2351376 −0.081 0.9352
ˆβother .0818402 .0517858 1.58 0.142 −.0321396 .19582 0.569 0.5691
ˆβ0 −.0021636 .043275 −0.05 0.961 −.0974112 .093084 0.407 0.6842
ˆβown − ˆβother −.6018681 .2399373 −2.51 0.029 −1.129967 −.0737696 −2.034 0.0420
When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we take into account that
observations within any of our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11).
TABLE 12: Estimation of equation (2) for coefficients from equation (1) in the less information
treatment
differently in groups or in circles. To make this argument more formally we estimate equation
(4) also for the less-information condition and show the results in table 11. The coefficient
βg that measures the additional gain from C in groups is positive under the less-information
condition but no longer significantly different from zero17. Also a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-
sum (Mann-Whitney) test finds the difference not significant (z = 0.467, P>|z| = 0.6404).
To study reciprocity and imitation in the less-information condition we estimate again equa-
tion (1) and show the results in figure 8. We can use the approach from equation (2) to test
for significant differences among the estimated coefficients in the different treatments. Results
are shown in table 12. Estimated coefficients are no longer significantly different in the two
treatments, only the difference ˆβown − ˆβother. Apparently participants still learn more from their
neighbours in groups than in circles.
4.5 Cooperation in seeded circles
In section 3 we explained how imitation of successful neighbours supports cooperation in a
spatial environment. This argument relies on the assumption of an initial cluster of cooperators
of sufficient size — with our payoffs we need at least five neighbouring cooperators. But how
does such a cluster appear? An evolutionary game theorist might argue that we only have to
wait long enough until such a cluster appears with a mutation. Experiments, however, last only
for a limited number of periods, and if the cooperative cluster does not appear during this time
cooperation might never start. We therefore seeded a circle with a cluster of five computerised
players as shown in figure 9. Players x2,x1,x0,y1,y2 (the ‘seeds’) are played by the computer
17When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we take into account that observations
within any of our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11).
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Solid lines show the cumulative distribution for the treatment with detailed payoff information.
Dotted lines show the distribution for the treatment with less payoff information.
FIGURE 8: Cumulative distribution of estimated parameters from equation (1) with detailed
and with less payoff information.
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The five black dots indicate the position of computerised players that always play C. The remaining
dots indicate the position of the human players.
FIGURE 9: The structure of seeded circles
and cooperate in every period.18 The remaining players are human which obtain the same
information as in the less-information treatment (section 4.4). Players x3,x4,y3,y4 do not know
that their neighbours are computers. The details of the behaviour of the human players is shown
in appendix B.5. Figure 10 shows the development of cooperation in this treatment. The dotted
line shows, as a reference, the relative frequency of cooperative players in groups. The other
lines show the development in circles. For the seeded circle we show two lines. The upper one
shows all participants, including those that have immediate neighbours in the seeding cluster.
These participants cooperate more than the remaining participants. When we exclude them, we
obtain the lower line.
As long as we exclude those players that are immediate neighbours of the seeds we do
not find a significant difference to the unseeded circles19. Those players who are immediate
neighbours of the seeds, however, cooperate significantly more frequently20.
The impact of strategic behaviour is under this condition similar to the other experiments
with less information. We estimate for all participants in the less information circle treatment
ˆβ1 = c+βsds (5)
where ˆβ1 is the value of β1 from equation (3) that we estimated for each participant separately,
c is a constant, and ds is a dummy that is one for seeded circles and zero otherwise. The results
are shown in table 13. We find that the seeding even reduces, however not significantly, the
increase in payoff that results from cooperation.
18Participants were told that would play a game with 18 players sitting round a circle. They could see that only
13 player were present in the laboratory. We were prepared not to answer any question regarding the five missing
players but in our experiments no participant ever missed them.
19t = 0.45, P>|t| = 0.663, When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we take into
account that observations within any of our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11). A rank sum test finds
z = −0.915, P>|z| = 0.3602
20t = 2.45, P>|t| = 0.058. When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we take into
account that observations within any of our experiments may be correlated (see footnote 11). A rank sum test finds
only z = 1.441, P>|z| = 0.1495.
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FIGURE 10: Cooperation in seeded circles
robust regression rank sum test
β σb t P>|t| 95% conf. interval z P>|z|
βs −.1360373 .3340148 −0.41 0.692 −.8802685 .608194 0.549 0.5830
c −.3679798 .2669898 −1.38 0.198 −.9628701 .2269106
TABLE 13: Result of estimating equation (5) in a seeded circle
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5 Summary
We have studied the impact of reinforcement, learning and strategic behaviour in two structures,
a spatial and a non-spatial one. Our initial aim was to find support for the imitation hypothesis
that is assumed in a large part of the theoretical literature on the evolution of local interaction.
This literature explains survival of cooperation in space based on the assumption that players
imitate successful neighbours. Since a cluster of cooperators is more successful than a clus-
ter of non-cooperative players imitation would yield a large part of the population to behave
cooperatively.
Players do, indeed, learn in our experiment. However, they mostly learn through reinforce-
ment, i.e. from their own payoff, and not through imitation of neighbours. If players do only
learn from their own experience cooperation does not spread through a local structure. This
finding is in line with the small amount of cooperation that we find in our experiments within a
local structure.
The lack of learning from others, however, does not explain the comparatively large amount
of cooperation in a spaceless structure — much more than in the local spatial structure. We
found that this large amount of cooperation in the spaceless structure can be related to strategic
behaviour. So far we do not know why strategic behaviour plays a more important role in the
spaceless structure than in the spatial one. One explanation is that the strategic impact of the
spatial structure is harder to understand than the spaceless one and, hence, players rely more on
learning.
We then tried to focus participants in both structures in the experiment more on learning.
In a new series of experiments we withheld the payoff matrix and also the history of individual
payoffs in the neighbourhood. Participants could only see average payoffs of the two strategies.
This led to a significant change for the spaceless structure where cooperation dropped down to
the level in the spatial structure. Behaviour in the spatial structure, however, was seemingly
unaffected. This confirms that behaviour in the spatial structure was driven by learning all the
time, only in the spaceless structure strategic behaviour played a role as long as participant were
not focused on learning.
As a third major modification of our setup we analysed a seeded population where a cluster
of computerised players cooperated all the time. If players would imitate successful neighbours
then such a cluster should be enough to initiate the growth of cooperation all over the network.
In our experiment, indeed, the immediate neighbours of this cluster were only slightly but sig-
nificantly more inclined to cooperate. This effect was so small that it could not reach farther
into the network.
To summarise: We have studied three effects that are commonly used to explain behaviour
in spatial and spaceless games: Reinforcement, imitation, and strategic behaviour. We found re-
inforcement to be a strong effect that was present in all conditions. Imitation was a much weaker
effect, in particular in the spatial structure, and too weak to support cooperation. Strategic be-
haviour, only present in the spaceless structure, could easily be eliminated through a change in
the available information.
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A List of Experiments
OVERVIEW:
Number of sessions in different treatments
information. . .
detailed less
5 computerised cooperators
group 9 10
circle 5 5 6
PARAMETERS OF EACH SESSION:
structure information computerised
cooperators
number of
players
1. Group less info 0 5
2. Group less info 0 5
3. Group less info 0 5
4. Group less info 0 5
5. Group less info 0 5
6. Group less info 0 5
7. Group less info 0 5
8. Group less info 0 5
9. Group less info 0 5
10. Group detailed info 0 5
11. Group detailed info 0 5
12. Group detailed info 0 5
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
structure information computerised
cooperators
number of
players
13. Group detailed info 0 5
14. Group detailed info 0 5
15. Group detailed info 0 5
16. Group detailed info 0 5
17. Group detailed info 0 5
18. Group detailed info 0 5
19. Group detailed info 0 5
20. Circle less info 0 14
21. Circle less info 0 18
22. Circle less info 0 18
23. Circle less info 0 18
24. Circle less info 0 14
25. Circle less info 5 13
26. Circle less info 5 10
27. Circle less info 5 13
28. Circle less info 5 10
29. Circle less info 5 13
30. Circle less info 5 13
31. Circle detailed info 0 18
32. Circle detailed info 0 18
33. Circle detailed info 0 18
34. Circle detailed info 0 18
35. Circle detailed info 0 18
B Raw data
In the following graphs each line represents the actions of a player from period 1 to period
80. Cooperation is shown as l, non cooperation as m. Neighbouring lines correspond to
neighbouring players in the experiment. In all treatments without computerised cooperators
(sections B.1 to B.4) the last line of each block of lines is in circles always a neighbour of the
first line of the same block. In these sections the display of circles is always rotated such that
least cooperative players are found in the first and the last lines.
B.1 Circle treatment with detailed information
1 20 60 80
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B.5 Seeded circle with less information
In the display of the circles the five computerised cooperators are not displayed. Their location
is on top of the first line and below the last line of each block. The two top lines and the two
bottom lines of each block are, hence, immediate neighbours of computerised cooperators.
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C Instructions of the Experiment
Please sit down and read the following instructions. It is important that you read them atten-
tively. A good understanding of the game is a prerequisite of your success.
After having read the instructions you will continue with a little quiz on the computer screen.
There you will be asked questions that will be easy to answer once you have read the instruc-
tions.
You may take notes but you may not talk to each other.
C.1 The structure of the neighbourhood
You y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8x9x8
x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1 Your gain depends on your decision and on the decision
of your two neighbours to the left and your two neigh-
bours to the right. These four neighbours remain the same
during the course of the experiment. You are connected
through the computer with these neighbours. We will not
tell who these neighbours are. Similarly your neighbours
will not be told who you are.
In the diagram on the right side your four neighbours are
shown cross-hatched.
You y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8x9x8
x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
Also your neighbours have neighbours. E.g. the neigh-
bours of y2 are players y4, y3, y1 and you.
C.2 Rounds
In this experiment you play several rounds. In each round you take a decision. Depending on
your decision and on the decision of your neighbours you receive points that will be converted
to DM at the end of the experiment.
C.3 Decision
In each round you choose among two decisions. You choose A or B. Your gain depends on what
you have chosen and on how many of your neighbours have chosen A or B.
This relation between choices and gains is the same for all participants.
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It will be shown on the screen in the form of a table.
Your neighbours play. . .
You play A
You play B . . . Your gain . . .
All players choose simultaneously, without knowing the decision of the others.
When all players have made their decision we continue with the next round.
C.4 Information after each round
In each round your receive information about your gain. Additionally you receive information
about the decision of your neighbours and their gain.
Round Your Decision Your Gain Decisions and gain in your neigbour-
hood, ordered by gain
. . . . . . . . . . . .
In each row you obtain information about one round. You find your decision and your gain the
second and the third column.
On the right side we show for each of your neighbours the decision of the neighbour and the
obtained gain. The ordering of neighbours in this column depends on the gain in this period.
First comes the neighbour with the highest gain, then the one whose gain was second, etc.. This
implies that in each period a different person can be the first in the right column.
C.5 Quiz
Please answer now the questions from the quiz on the computer screen. If you are unsure how
to answer a question, please consult your instructions.
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